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Slaying the misshapen monster: The case for
constitutional heuristics∗
TT Arvind† Lindsay Stirton‡
I Introduction
On 9 February 1784 Adriaan Kluit, rector magnificus at the University of
Leiden, ascended the podium to deliver his valedictory address: ‘On the
abuse of constitutional law’.1 Kluit was speaking at a time of fierce contes-
tation in Dutch politics between the Orangists (with whom Kluit identified)
and the anti-Orangist ‘Patriots’. The language of constitutional theory had
become a key weapon in their battle, and it was to that language that Kluit’s
address was directed. Its contents were sharp and uncompromising. The Pa-
triots, Kluit said, had created ‘a misshapen monster in constitutional law.’2
The excellent provisions of the Dutch state’s settled constitutional institu-
tions had established civil liberty on the firmest foundations, but these ac-
complishments were threatened by those who, posing as the commonwealth’s
physicians, were taking it down a path of ruin.3 The Patriots’ constitutional
doctrines, Kluit warned, were a destructive plague bringing catastrophes
upon commonwealths.4
This chapter is motivated by our sense that little has changed since
Kluit’s day in the methodology of constitutional theory and how it deals
with disagreement. The debate between Kluit and the Patriots was at one
level a theoretical debate as to the meaning of liberty, and whether civil lib-
erty mattered more than political liberty. Yet the argument about these con-
cepts was suffused with claims about facts: about the Netherlands’ Batavian
∗We are grateful to the University of York for funding the translation of non-English
source documents used in this chapter, to Firat Cengiz for invaluable assistance with locat-
ing Turkish sources, and to Simon Halliday, Alex Latham-Gambi, Lawrence McNamara,
and the volume editors for comments on an earlier draft.
†York Law School, University of York. email:t.t.arvind@york.ac.uk
‡School of Law, Politics, and Sociology, University of Sussex.
email:l.stirton@sussex.ac.uk







past and commercial present, about the regicides, oppressions, and tumults
that afflicted polities at different points of time, about which political trea-
tises were useful guides and which should be disregarded, and so on. And,
crucially, the parties’ disagreement was marked by an inability to agree on
which of these facts were of significance in understanding the true nature of
the eighteenth-century Dutch constitution.5
And so it remains in the present day. Constitutional theorists, unlike po-
litical theorists, are concerned with the specifics of a particular constitutional
system or set of systems. The goal of constitutional theory is to identify the
institutions and principles that underpin the public life of a specific state,
rather than consider how all states ought to be organised. Of their nature,
they therefore necessarily (if implicitly) claim to be not merely dialectically
effective (likely to be persuasive), but also epistemically effective (likely to
produce a true understanding of the constitution).6 Notwithstanding their
claim to merely be advancing arguments about how a particular constitution
ought to be understood, they are beneath their surface concerned with facts
precisely as the theories of Kluit’s day were.
Where, then, does theories’ epistemic confidence come from? This ques-
tion is rarely discussed explicitly. Theorists rarely discuss the process through
which their theories were formed, and their writing usually seeks only to
persuade the reader of its correctness rather than (as, for example, in sci-
ence) to explain why the process by which the theory was constructed or
tested meets criteria for justified belief. The rightness or wrongness of a
theory is treated as a matter to be uncovered through argumentation and
persuasion, rather than through an assessment of the processes that under-
pinned its construction and the biases if any that they bequeathed to the
theory.7 Kluit’s language in terming opposing theories of the eighteenth cen-
tury Dutch constitution a misshapen monster and a destructive plague may
well be more extreme than the terms a modern-day theorist would use, but
this is a matter of degree rather than kind. The underpinning assumptions
remain the same: each theory presents itself as a correct understanding of
the principled and institutional underpinnings of a constitution’s excellence
that safeguards its accomplishments, unlike its rivals.
The impact of this on constitutional theory has not been a happy one.
The reliance on persuasion means that constitutional theory lacks any method
5 WRE Velema, ‘The concept of liberty in the Dutch Republic, 1780-1787’ in WRE
Velema (ed), Republicans: Essays on Eighteenth-Century Dutch Political Thought (Brill
2007) provides a concise and accessible overview of the broader debate and Kluit’s position
within it.
6 On the role of epistemic and dialectical effectiveness in disagreement, see E Sosa, ‘The
epistemology of disagreement’ in A Haddock, A Millar, and D Pritchard (eds), Social
Epistemology (Oxford University Press 2010) 293-297.
7 A similar point was made by Herbert Simon about public administration theory in
the mid-twentieth century. See HA Simon, ‘The proverbs of Administration’ (1946) 6(1)
Public Administraiton Review 53.
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beyond argumentation for judging the truth or falsity of a given theory of the
constitution, reducing it to a cycle of disputation between different ‘styles of
public law thought’.8 But even more fundamentally, rhetorical or philosoph-
ical attractiveness is by itself an inadequate basis for evaluating whether
a particular constitutional theory ought to be accepted by a polity. Con-
stitutional theories have non-trivial real world consequences because they
influence the conduct of public affairs, and the history of constitutional
thought is littered with constitutional theories whose rhetorical power made
them appear normatively attractive in their day but whose practical con-
sequences were deeply troubling. Examples range from Mill’s theory of
benevolent colonial despotism which exercised a shaping influence over the
imperial constitution in the late nineteenth century,9 to John Calhoun’s anti-
majoritarian theory of the US constitution which, despite being designed to
justify the continuance of slavery, was built on a moral rhetoric so alluring
that it influenced thinkers as liberal as Lord Acton.10
Overcoming these problems requires a fuller understanding of the strengths
and limitations of the processes and techniques constitutional theorists use
to derive theories and the manner in which they justify their belief in the
reliability of those processes. In Part II, we draw on the literature on social
epistemology to show that the process of constructing any theory of a specific
constitution involves two distinct forms of engagement with facts: firstly,
identifying facts that have constitutional salience and, secondly, assigning
significance to those selected facts. There are strong parallels between these
processes and those implicated in the construction and transmission of tradi-
tions, an analysis of which sheds new and useful light on how constitutional
theories construct the constitutional world they describe.
In Part III we build on the argument of Part II to show that there are
four broad families of approaches to selecting and assigning normative sig-
nificance to facts into which most constitutional theories can be classified.
Each of these families is united by its propensity for highlighting certain
types of features, and its predilection to read certain types of normative
significance into constitutional facts. As we show, a closer focus on these
predilections not only helps us achieve a better understanding of how consti-
tutional theories are made, but also of the limitations those methodologies
impose on constitutional theory.
In Part IV, we argue that while these families have value, the failure to
8 M Loughlin, Public law and Political Theory (Clarendon Press 1992) 62.
9 On Mill’s theory and its impact, see J Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial
Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton University Press 2005) 133-162.
10 On Calhoun’s theories and slavery, see LK Ford Jr, ‘Inventing the Concurrent Ma-
jority: Madison, Calhoun, and the Problem of Majoritarianism in American Political
Thought’ (1994) 60(1) Journal of Southern History 19. On the influence it exercised over
Lord Acton, see e.g. L Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power (The Free Press 1948)
225-231.
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understand their aetiology and limitations has led to positions in constitu-
tional debates becoming entrenched, polarised, and unyielding. Our purpose
in making this point is methodological rather than merely critical. The
methodology of constitutional theory suffers from the failure to recognise
the extent to which constitutional theories are shaped by the predilections
and predispositions that underlie them. We propose a new approach to con-
stitutional theorisation and constitutional method which takes a heuristic
approach, relating constitutional facts to the shifting needs of the polity,
and opening up a more pragmatic space for theoretical debate and doctrine-
making in constitutional scholarship.
II Facts, Theories, and Traditions: Making the constitutional
world
A The social epistemology of constitutional theory
Constitutional theorists who state that a particular theory is superior to an-
other are making a claim qualitatively different from—say—the claim that
Beethoven is a better composer than Mozart. The latter statement deals
with a matter of subjective opinion. However strongly one may hold a belief
as to the relative superiority of one, few will argue that there is a theorist-
external standard by which that belief can be judged. Constitutional theo-
rists, in contrast, do make such claims. A theorist who claims that political
constitutionalism provides a better account of the UK’s constitution than
legal constitutionalism,11 or that current US constitutional jurisprudence
remains flawed by the inherent contradiction between the Constitution’s
promise of liberty and its compromises and contradictions on the position
of African Americans,12 is claiming that there is something about the insti-
tutional features of the relevant constitutional order that means that their
theory describes the constitution with greater accuracy than others.
It is, of course, possible to take a critical standpoint and treat these
claims as mere rhetoric. Examination of debates in constitutional theory,
however, suggests that the claims are seriously meant—that theorists be-
lieve, and hold themselves justified in believing, that the facts their theories
assert about a constitutional order are true in a way that others are not. On
what basis, then, do theorists form this belief? What gives them the confi-
dence that their approach to theory-formation is epistemically effective and
not just dialectically effective? Our case in favour of heuristics is founded on
the understanding that there are inherent flaws in the answers which con-
stitutional theories implicitly give to this question. Our focus in this section
11 See e.g. A Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ (2002) 22(1) Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 157.
12 See e.g. D Hall, ‘The constitution and race: A critical perspective’ (1988) 5(2) New
York Law School Journal of Human Rights 229.
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is, accordingly, on setting out our analysis of what those answers are.
Our starting point lies in two observations about how constitutional
theories work. Firstly, all constitutional theories draw on a shared pool of
facts about a polity. Disagreements between constitutional theorists do not
relate to whether King John really signed a document in 1215 which included
a statement that freemen would not be imprisoned save by the law of the
land, or whether the Constitution of India really includes an Article that
states that no person shall be denied equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws. They relate, rather to the institutional status of
facts and to whether they have deontic power.13 Simply put, disagreements
in constitutional theory relate to whether a specific fact in the shared pool
carries any significance at all for our understanding of how the broader
constitutional order operates today, and if so what.
Secondly, in forming and justifying positions on these points, constitu-
tional theorists are concerned not just with codified or uncodified constitu-
tional texts as they stand in the present, but also with the accreted sum of
practices, actions, and ideas inherited from the past that they hold to be
constitutionally significant; and their purpose in so engaging is to derive a
body of precepts that can be entrenched and transmitted to the future as
determinative of the proper conduct of constitutional affairs.
The remainder of this section discusses these processes, and how they
purport to give theorists confidence in their epistemic effectiveness.
B Taking facts seriously
Let us begin with the first of these, namely, the processes underpinning a
theorist’s treatment of a fact as having institutional significance and deontic
power. This entails, firstly, selecting a subset of facts by attaching con-
stitutional salience to specific facts taken from the common stock of facts
bequeathed by the past. Secondly, it entails deriving lessons for the present
from those facts in terms of actions or institutional configurations that they
recommend, rule out, or warn against—in other words, deriving significance
from those facts.
The debate in the UK between political and legal constitutionalists
presents illustrates the role the attribution of salience plays in constitu-
tional theory. In his influential treatise Law, Liberty, and Justice, one of
the foundational works of modern legal constitutionalism, TRS Allan be-
gins by linking Dicey’s relevance to the role factual considerations played in
Dicey’s theory. ‘Contrary to orthodox opinion’, Allan declares, Dicey ‘was
wise to seek an interpretation of the rule of law which reflected the tradi-
tions and peculiarities of English common law.’ (Emphasis added)14 Allan
13 The language of institutional facts and deontic power is taken from the work of John
Searle. See especially JR Searle, The construction of social reality (The Free Press 1995).
14 TRS Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitution-
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then proceeds to build his own theory of the rule of law. In doing so, he
is informed and influenced by his reading of contemporary legal and politi-
cal philosophers, in particular Raz and Dworkin.15 But his account of that
philosophy is interwoven with a detailed analysis of how judges in twentieth
century UK, working with the material of earlier eras, developed, applied,
and extended the rule of law.16 Like Dicey, in other words, Allan’s theory
is built on a deep engagement with the ‘traditions and peculiarities’ of the
UK’s constitutional order and the process by which it emerged (an analysis
that, in later work, is extended to also encompass the US and Australia).17
It is built on and underpinned by facts.
This is also true of political constitutionalists. Crucially, however, they
differ in which facts they emphasise. Adam Tomkins, for example, in Our
Republican Constitution, engages not just with the political philosophy of
civic republicanism, but with English constitutional history.18 But where
Allan’s focus is on the contribution made by courts to constitutional gov-
ernment and constitutional development, Tomkins’ focus is on episodes in
which the courts failed to protect private persons against oppressive institu-
tions.19 In the episodes he discusses, it was Parliamentary institutions that
took the lead.20 As in Allan’s work, this engagement with the traditions and
peculiarities of the UK’s constitutional order exercises a shaping influence.
Constitutional theories, in other words, are underpinned by disagree-
ments about which facts are significance for understanding the constitu-
tional arrangements of a polity. But, in addition to disagreements about
which facts are significant, theorists may also disagree about what that sig-
nificance is. They may agree on the facts that shed light on the present
constitutional order, but disagree on the light they shed.
The debate about the right to keep and bear arms in the US Constitu-
tion provides a good example. For much of the constitutional history of the
US, African-Americans were denied the right to keep and bear arms notwith-
standing the Second Amendment and its counterparts in state constitutions,
and militias soldiered by arms-bearing white men were regularly deployed
to suppress dissent by African Americans. In a recent treatise, Carol An-
derson draws on the interweaving of the past history of arms-bearing and
the systematic suppression of African Americans to argue that the Second
Amendment is at its heart lethal and ‘steeped in anti-Blackness’, a ‘loaded
weapon. . . just waiting for the hand of some authority to put it to use.’21
alism (Oxford University Press 1994) 21.
15 Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice (n 14) 23-29, 45-48.
16 ibid, 32-44.
17 TRS Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford
University Press 2003).
18 A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing 2005).
19 ibid 69-87.
20 ibid, 87-109.
21 C Anderson, The Second: Race and Guns in a Fatally Unequal America (Bloomsbury
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A strikingly different reading of the same history is presented in the con-
curring opinion of Justice Clarence Thomas inMcDonald v City of Chicago,22
In contrast to Anderson’s view, Thomas argued for an extension of the
Amendment by holding that the Fourteenth Amendment made the right it
created valid against state governments. Thomas does not differ from An-
derson’s reading of the past. Like her, he discusses the racialised history of
arms-bearing and arms laws in the US. But Thomas attaches a very different
significance to these aspects of the past. Where Anderson sees evidence of
a right fatally tainted by racism, Thomas sees a warning against permitting
state power to be deployed to disarm individuals. The significance of its
history and the lesson it holds for the present is, for Thomas, that individ-
ual rights conferred by the Second Amendment need to be better secured
against governmental interference.
C Continuity and the ascription of deontic power
The differences discussed in the previous section are not random. As we show
in this section, they are the result of processes which strongly resemble the
processes by which traditions are developed, reworked, and adapted.
A tradition is at its heart an attempt to create a pattern to guide future
action. Traditions differ from evanescent action in that they outlive the spe-
cific circumstances against whose background they were originally enacted.23
Constitutional theory likewise differs from an individual application of legal
doctrine in that a theory is intended to identify general patterns which can
guide future action in different circumstances. Equally, both constitutional
theory and traditions are principally concerned with the normative prescrip-
tions, precedents, and conditions for action established by the material that
constitutes the theory or tradition. Like constitutional theory, a tradition
seeks to use its material to identify and establish exemplars of action. Finally
constitutional theory, like a tradition, seeks to assemble not a disparate set
of records of past action but a received image of patterns, practices, beliefs,
and institutions which require, regulate, permit, or prohibit the enactment
of particular patterns of future action.24
The idea that the law resembles a tradition is, of course, not novel.25
Nevertheless, a closer exploration of the analogy sheds useful light on the
methodology of constitutional theory, as well as why that methodology has a
propensity to produce disagreements that are sharp, long-lasting, and seem-
ingly intractable. As theorists of traditions have pointed out, the material
2021).
22 (2010) 561 US 742.
23 E Shills, Tradition (University of Chicago Press 1981) 31-32.
24 ibid, 12-13.
25 See e.g. G Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Clarendon Press
1986); N Duxbury, Frederick Pollock and the English Juristic Tradition (Oxford University
Press 2004).
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that constitutes a tradition can be classified into three elements: the aspects
of the tradition that constitute its continuity, a canon of written texts that
cumulatively embody the distinctive features of that tradition, and a core
of teachings or precepts that are foundational to the tradition and cannot
be rejected without rejecting the tradition.26 A tradition’s core is placed
beyond criticism, whereas a canon is subject to refinement, evolution, and
scrutiny.27
Continuities, canons, and cores are fundamental to constitutional theory.
Theorists seek to uncover what they believe to be the best understanding
of a constitution by examining textual evidence (treatises, cases, statutes,
etc.), as well as broader evidence of constitutional practices, beliefs, and
outcomes over time. They decide not just how much weight to attach to a
particular item of evidence and what that evidence tells us, but also what
constitutes evidence of constitutional practice in the first place.28 And the
starting point for that process is fundamentally determined by their views
as to where constitutional continuity lies.
Consider, for example, the respective positions occupied by the pre-
Union Parliaments of England, Scotland, and Ireland in the UK’s consti-
tutional imagination. The post-Union Parliament is, in principle, a succes-
sor to all three Parliaments; yet in practice constitutional theorists tend to
draw exclusively on the precedents established by the English Parliament,
even where those of other parliaments speak squarely to issues of theoretical
relevance. Take, for example, the question of whether Parliament can be
prorogued against its will—a question that was of considerable interest to
constitutional theorists in the UK in 2019. In December 1639 the Scottish
Parliament, faced with an attempt by the King to prorogue it, declared that
it could not be prorogued without its consent, and in June 1640 it abolished
one of the main instruments of executive control over it.29 That this episode
hardly figured in discussions of the purported prorogation of August 2019
is not because the Scottish Parliament is ignored or not studied. Rather,
it is because modern constitutional theorists largely share Tomkins’s per-
ception that the modern British constitution ‘for good or ill. . . was made in
England.’30 To inform a constitutional theory, and action must, be seen as
forming part of an intellectual continuity with the present, and the Scottish
Parliament’s pasts are not so regarded notwithstanding the legal continuity.
The process involved in identifying continuity between the practices and
26 J Alexander, ‘A systematic theory of tradition’ (2016) 10(1) Journal of the Philosophy
of History 1.
27 ibid, 23-24.
28 See e.g Loughlin (n 8) 59.
29 For the political context, see IM Smart, ‘The political ideas of the Scottish Covenan-
ters, 1638-1688’ (1980) 1(2) History of Political Thought 167, 173.
30 Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (n 18) 114. It is pertinent to note that while
Tomkins discusses the history of the Covenanting Parliament, he does not mention the
actions discussed here.


























































Fig. 1: The interaction between core, canon, and continuity
beliefs of the past and those of the present day might be termed ‘memorial-
isation’. The facts implicated in memorialisation are public or social facts:
the images of public actions, practices, and beliefs from the past that are
seen by a theorist as having enduring relevance when it comes to determining
how a polity’s constitutional affairs should be conducted.31 Disagreement in
constitutional theory is frequently a consequence of different views about
where continuity lies. The disagreement between Anderson and Thomas
over the Second Amendment in the US, for example, reflects how each of
them sees constitutional continuity. To Anderson, the continuity implicated
31 Alexander (n 26) 12.
II Facts, Theories, and Traditions: Making the constitutional world 10
in the right to keep and bear arms is the phenomenon of the consistent and
systematic oppression of African Americans, and the Second Amendment’s
full enforcement therefore necessarily entails the continuance of that oppres-
sion. To Thomas, in contrast, the continuity in question is the assurance
to every individual of the right to acquire and possess the means to defend
oneself against oppression, and the Second Amendment’s full enforcement
therefore has the potential to operate as a powerful tool for African Ameri-
can rights.
Similar differences exist elsewhere. The debate between political and
legal constitutionalism in the UK is driven by whether one sees greater
constitutional continuity with the present day in the actions of the mid
seventeenth-century legislature or the early seventeenth-century and late
eighteenth-century courts. Likewise, theoretical debates around post-colonial
constitutions such as India’s have involved whether their independent con-
stitutions marked the creation of an order radically different from any they
had previously had, or whether there are continuities between the modern
constitutional order and the constitutional ideas on which the independence
movement was built, or even with the older ideas and theories underpinning
the pre-colonial constitutional order.
Differences as to where continuity lies, in other words, underpin disagree-
ments about which of the shared store of facts deserve to be given deontic
power. As the next section shows, these differences are in turn shaped by
a theorist’s understanding of the other two components of tradition: cores
and canons.
D Core and canon in constitutional theory
Two other processes operate alongside memorialisation: ‘elevation’, by which
certain texts acquire canonical status, and ‘sacralisation’ or, less provoca-
tively, ‘axiomatisation’ by which certain precepts acquire the status of an
unchallengeable core. The three processes are closely intertwined in the
making of constitutional theories, which are defined both by the processes
themselves and by how they interact, as Figure 1 illustrates.
A canon includes not just the written text of a constitution (in jurisdic-
tions that have one), but also other texts. It may include cases seen as being
of high constitutional significance: for example, Chief Justice Marshall’s de-
cision establishing the principle of judicial review in the US in Marbury v
Madison,32 or the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Kesavananda
Bharati v State of Kerala33 establishing the basic structure doctrine under
which a constitution may not be amended in a way that cuts against its fun-
damental elements or values.34 It may also include texts that do not have
32 (1803) 5 US 137.
33 AIR 1973 SC 1461
34 The doctrine in turn was influenced by the work of the German jurist Dietrich Conrad.
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the force of law but nevertheless are seen by a theorist as carrying weight.
These could be historical documents, such as the Federalist Papers in the
US, or they could be particularly influential commentaries, such as the com-
mentaries of Ito Hirobumi on the Meiji Constitution in pre-War Japan,35 or
even works of legal or political philosophy: for example, the status occupied
by the works of Joseph Raz or John Rawls in many present-day constitu-
tional theories in the common law world. As with continuity, theorists can
and do differ on which texts belong in the canon: for example, the debate
among constitutional theorists in the UK about whether the decision in
Anisminic36 should be seen as an important part of the canon or as a case
that borders on the heretical.
In contrast to continuities and canons, theories of constitutional law do
not need to affirm a core, although in practice most do. A core consists
of central precepts whose importance to a constitution is seen as being so
foundational that they are sacralised and placed beyond question or beyond
criticism. The idea of Parliamentary sovereignty constitutes precisely such
a core in many modern theories of the UK’s constitution, and jurisdictions
such as India37 and Kenya38 which have a ‘basic structure’ doctrine hold-
ing certain aspects of their constitutions to be unamendable have arguably
turned those aspects into a non-challengeable core.
A core may be the subject of broad consensus. The idea of the ‘balanced
constitution’ that dominated constitutional thought in the UK from the six-
teenth century to the 1830s is an example: it was accepted as underpinning
the UK’s constitution by thinkers as diverse as Blackstone, Henry St. John
Bolingbroke, Edmund Burke, Walter Moyle, and even Charles I.39 But what
constitutes the core, too, is capable of being contested, as the strident de-
bates over the place of doctrines such as human rights, or even devolution,
within the UK’s constitutional order indicate. Equally, it is wholly pos-
sible for a constitutional theory to lack a core if no doctrines are seen as
unquestionable. Lord Steyn’s controversial statement in Jackson40 that the
supremacy of Parliament was a judicial creation which, like all judicial cre-
For a discussion, see M Polzin, ‘The basic-structure doctrine and its German and French
origins: A tale of migration, integration, invention and forgetting’ (2021) 5(1) Indian Law
Review 45.
35 For an accessible overview, see T Masuda, ‘The Meiji Constitution: Theory and Prac-
tice, 1890-1913’ (1991) 1 East Asian History 125.
36 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL)
37 Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461
38 David Ndii v Attorney General, High Court of Kenya, decision of 13 May 2021, avail-
able at https://www.afronomicslaw.org/sites/default/files/pdf/BBI%20Consolidated%20Judgment%20-
%20Final%20Version%20-%20As%20Delivered.pdf
39 On the Royalist contribution to the received understanding of the doctrine, see CC
Weston, ‘English Constitutional Doctrines from the Fifteenth Century to the Seventeenth:
II. The Theory of Mixed Monarchy under Charles I and after’ (1960) 75 The English
Historical Review 426.
40 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262.
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ations, could be judicially qualified or limited41 is an example of precisely
such a position. To Lord Steyn, whilst the UK’s constitution has a canon,
none of its precepts in that canon are beyond questioning, with the result
that there is nothing in the constitution that can be said to constitute a
core.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the process of theorisation places core, canon,
and continuity in constant dialogue—and, occasionally, conflict—with each
other. Not every case or other text that might have a claim to canonical
status will fit with a given theorist’s understanding of continuity, nor will
it necessarily fit with that theorist’s view of the core. The same is true of
the facts that might have a claim to form part of a polity’s constitutional
continuity, and the precepts that might have a claim to form part of its
constitutional core. In such a situation, the theorist faces the task of either
resolving the seeming conflict, or altering their picture of the core, canon,
or continuity by rejecting or reworking portions of them.
The history of constitutional theory and constitutional conflict provides
several examples of this process of rejection, harmonisation, and resolution.
The eighteenth-century Dutch debate between the Orangists and Patriots,
for example, saw the Orangists reject the idea that political liberty formed
part of the core of the Dutch constitution, because they saw it conflicting
with the prosperous commercial society underpinned by civil (rather than
political) liberty, which they saw as being at the heart of constitutional
continuity in the Netherlands.42 Similarly, the difference between the con-
stitutional theories of Hozumi Yatsuka and Minobe Tatsukichi in pre-War
Japan revolved at a fundamental level around the clash between core and
continuity—and, in particular, whether the adoption of a new, Western-
influenced constitution had created a new, and more liberal, core which
limited the Emperor’s powers (as Minobe argued), or whether (as Hozumi
argued) even the most liberal provisions in the Constitution must be read
subject to the deeper constitutional continuity represented by the tradi-
tional idea of the state as a family with the Emperor at its head.43 An
even starker example is provided by the support which many leading con-
stitutional scholars in Turkey gave the military coup of 27 May 1960. The
ousted government, they argued, had repeatedly violated the secular repub-
lican principles on which Ataturk’s Turkey was founded. Given the constitu-
tion’s inadequacy when it came to defending that core, the only solution was
to sweep away both the government and the constitution, and put in their
place a new set of arrangements. The ‘canon’ of the constitutional text could
be rejected in defence of the deeper core represented by Ataturk’s secular
41 ibid [102].
42 Kluit (n 1) 104-108.
43 Masuda (n 35) 135-138. For a somewhat unsympathetic but factually accurate discus-
sion of Hozumi’s position, see R Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law: Emperor,
State, and Law in The thought of Hozumi Yatsuka (Harvard University Press 1970).
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republican vision.44
These examples are historical, but the pattern also holds in relation to
present day constitutional theory. Consider, for example, Lord Steyn’s con-
troversial statements on Parliamentary sovereignty in Jackson. Lord Steyn
was, arguably, rejecting the idea that Parliamentary sovereignty constituted
the core of the constitution precisely because he was unable to reconcile it
with what he believed to be an important element that emerged from the
canon, namely, the historical commitment of the judiciary to protecting the
polity from arbitrary and despotic government. In effect, when faced with
a clash between canon and core, his position led him to reject the orthodox
account of the core rather than revise the canon.
To sum up: our purpose in this section has been to shed light on how
constitutional theorists reach, and have epistemic confidence in, the position
that their constitutional theories contain a more accurate description of
constitutional facts than other competing theories. As we have shown, the
process involves ascribing salience and significance to specific facts, and is
shaped by the theorist’s views on the constitution’s continuities, canons,
and core precepts. In the next section, we show that this process in turn
is shaped by underlying predispositions stemming from how a theorist sees
the polity in question, which cumulatively have a largely negative effect on
constitutional theory.
III A Methodology for Constitutional Theory
A A Taxonomy of Constitutional World-Views
The argument in section II has demonstrated that the claim that one con-
stitutional theory is superior to another cannot be defended with reference
to which theory is the better fit with salient and significant facts: questions
of salience and significance of constitutional facts are themselves a prod-
uct of processes of constitutional world-making that are highly contingent.
In a companion piece to the present chapter, co-written with Simon Hall-
iday,45 we proposed a taxonomy, derived from Mary Douglas’s grid-group
cultural theory, for exploring and classifying the different constitutional un-
derstandings of the task of judicial review in relation to administrative jus-
tice. In order to understand the divergent epistemologies underpinning con-
stitutional world-views, we propose a similar scheme, based on the same
two-dimensional classification.
Douglas terms her dimensions ‘grid’ and ‘group’. The grid dimensions
44 ‘The Principles identified by the Constitutional Commission’, Resmi Gazete, 1 July
1960, 1636 (Part I); 2 July 1960, 1644 (Part II); translation on file with the authors.
45 TT Arvind, S Halliday, and L Stirton, ‘Judicial Review and Administrative Justice’
in J Tomlinson and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Administrative Justice (Oxford
University Press 2021)
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represents the spectrum between transactions mediated by rigid institutional
classification and those where structure is minimal.46 This presents an ob-
vious analogy with the formal/substantive distinction familiar to constitu-
tional theory. Formalist understandings of the constitution emphasise the
authority and legal competence of constitutional actors to exercise partic-
ular powers on particular grounds, even where that comes ‘at the expense
of justice or wise policy or efficiency in the individual case.’47 A substan-
tivist approach in contrast accords less priority to structure, and more to
the achievement of fundamental social values, or desirable outcomes.48
The group dimension, which represents the extent to which an individual
is incorporated into a group, can similarly be interpreted in terms of the ex-
tent to which the constitution defines and embraces—and indeed imposes—
broadly accepted social goals. This dimension is captured in Banakar and
Travers’ distinction between ‘conflict’ and ‘consensus’ prespectives on soci-
ety49—though we prefer to use the terms ‘discord’ and concord’, to capture
the distinction between a polity characterised by ‘conflict, bargaining and
agreement’50 and one united by a conception of the common good sustained
and realised through the constitutional order. Combining the two dimen-
sions, we can identify four distinct ways of seeing constitutions, illustrated
in Figure 2. These are discussed in subsections (B)–(E) below.
B The constitution as a shield
The lower left taxon sees the constitution as a shield to protect individuals
against aggression by others and against intrusions by the state. This image
of the constitution is exemplified by the seventeenth century English consti-
tutional theorist, John Locke, who understood Government as being brought
into being by the constitution, ‘. . . for the Preservation of every Mans Right
and Property, by preserving him from the Violence or Injury of others. . . ’.51
Locke’s account of Government as emerging from the consent of the peo-
ple to form a commonwealth for the better protection of their rights has
influenced libertarian readings of the US Constitution. Randy Barnett, for
46 M Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (Routledge 1992) 106.
47 F Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Harvard
University Press 2009) 35
48 cf the contrast between Allan’s account of the principle of the rule of law at TRS
Allan, The sovereignty of law: freedom, constitution, and common law (Oxford University
Press 2013) 12 and Dicey’s emphasis on the limits on the powers of government.
49 R Banakar and M Travers, ‘Introduction’ in Law and social theory (Hart Publishing
2014).
50 R Dahl, ‘Decision-making in a democracy: the Supreme Court as a national policy-
maker’ (1957) 6 Journal of Public Law 279, 294.
51 J Locke, ‘First Treatise’ in P Laslett (ed), Two Treatises on Government (first pub-
lished 1689, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge University
Press 1960), §92.












Fig. 2: Four ways of seeing constitutions
example, has offered a modern, Lockean reading of the US constitution.52
The conception of the constitution as a shield influences both the manner
in which continuity with the past is read, and the manner in which the
implications of the canon are selected. Janet Ajzenstat, for example, has
argued that the fathers of Canada’s Confederation set about to create a
civic government based on the actual consent of the people—people who
unsurprisingly held different views on such issues as the extent of collective
provision of welfare, civil liberties versus national security, and many other
issues.53 She reads the debates on Confederation in the colonial assemblies
as demonstrating that a real concern at the time was how such consent could
meaningfully given—whether the assent of the assemblies was sufficient, or
whether it required the assent of the people directly, through a plebiscite for
example. TRS Allan, for his part, draws on the image of the constitution as
a shield to frame the central problem of public law as that of ‘. . . devising
means for the protection and enhancement of individual human rights in a
52 RE Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty - Updated
Edition (Princeton University Press 2013)
53 J Ajzenstat, Canadian Founding: John Locke and Parliament (McGill-Queen’s Stud-
ies in the History of Ideas, McGill-Queen’s University Press 2007).
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manner consistent with the democratic basis of our institutions.’54
Here, the constitution’s ability to provide an assurance that natural
rights are not violated takes the place of consent as providing the constitu-
tional order’s core, thus combining a substantive conception of the law with
a propensity to assign significance to facts depicting society as a field of dis-
cord. The link between rights-based approaches and a discord perspective
on society is well captured by the claim of Sir John Laws that ‘the language
of rights is not the language of morality but of conflict.’55 Because this
tradition sees conflicts inevitably arise between the respective goals, plans,
visions and values held by different persons, as well as between these and the
collective interests of the polity, its measure of the worth of the constitution
is its ability to secure an appropriately defined autonomous sphere in which
individuals can pursue their goals, plans, visions and values. The proper
role of the constitution is preventing governments from pursuing an expan-
sive conception of the common good where doing so would intrude into this
protected sphere. Questions of institutional form are not ignored, but they
take second place to questions of substance. The constitutional rulebook’s
significance is only as a means to the end of upholding the principles that
constitute the tradition’s core. Locke’s argument that the legislative power
should be vested at least in part in an elected assembly, for example, was
not based on a belief that the endorsement of the peoples’ representatives
was sufficient to imbue any positive enactment with the requisite authority.
Rather, Locke believed that if the approval of such a body were required
for passing legislation or levying taxes, these would be no more oppressive
nor restrictive of liberty than that which was necessary to the proper, lim-
ited purpose of government. The process of deliberation and assent, in other
words, mattered because it made it more likely that the resulting laws would
respect the rights of persons.
C The constitution as the cornerstone of social and political life
Remaining at the substantive end of the vertical axis, but moving towards
concord brings us to the image of the constitution as a cornerstone of social
and political life. This image differs from the understanding of the consti-
tution as a shield in that it allows for a fuller conception of the public good,
and hence of a sense of purpose for the polity—a sense of purpose which it
is the function of the constitution to nourish and sustain. The image of the
constitution as a cornerstone comes from the subtitle of Granville Austin’s
account of the founding of India’s constitution: ‘the cornerstone of a na-
tion.’ The combination in this perspective of a substantive interpretation of
constitutional law with a concordant, even purposive view of the polity, is
54 TRS Allan, ‘Legislative supremacy and the rule of law: democracy and constitution-
alism’ (1986) 44(1) Cambridge Law Journal 111.
55 J Laws, ‘The Constitution: Morals and Rights’ [1996] (Winter) Public Law 622, 626.
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seen in Austin’s account of the purposes of the constitution as understood
by members of the constituent assembly:
The Constitution was to foster the achievement of many goals.
Transcendent among them was that of social revolution. Through
this revolution would be fulfilled the basic needs of the common
man, and, it was hoped, this revolution would bring about fun-
damental changes in the structure of Indian society—a society
with a long and glorious cultural tradition, but greatly in need,
Assembly members believed, of a powerful infusion of energy and
rationalism.56
This illustrates a number of paradigmatic features of the lower left taxon.
First, what is being constituted (or more accurately, re-constituted) is not
just India’s government, but India’s society and polity, which was to be
infused with a sense of purpose. The founders were effecting a social rev-
olution with a number of objectives: national unity and domestic stability,
which Austin tells us, were ‘considered necessary prerequisites for a social
renascence’57, the protection of minority interests, an efficient government
and administration, the protection of national security, together with insti-
tutions to achieve them.58
If Locke is the exemplar of a seventeenth century theorist of the con-
stitution as a shield, then Thomas Paine writing a century later illustrates
the image of the constitution as a cornerstone. For Paine, the purposes of
government extended beyond the preservation of order. In Agrarian Justice
Paine emerges as an advocate of a rudimentary basic income provided by
the commonwealth. In his introduction to Paine’s Political Writings, Kuk-
lick attributes the ease with which Paine combined the defence of liberty
with the good of the polity to his Quaker roots: ‘in Quaker doctrine there
was a concern not only for individual conscience also for the commuity of
Friends.’59
A number of consequences follow from the expanded space for the pub-
lic interest that this bottom right understanding allows, compared with the
lower-left taxon. Instead of thinking wholly in terms of protection against
rights violation, attention turns towards ensuring that the proper identifica-
tion of the common interest. Much of the Rights of Man, Part I is taken up
with a favourable contrast between the French Revolutionary Constitution
of 1791 and the English constitution—which Paine thought was no consti-
tution at all, ‘a thing in name only.’ Crucially the points of comparison




59 B Kuklick, ‘Introduction’ in Thomas Paine, Political Writings (Revised edition, Cam-
bridge University Press 2000) xviii.
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are overwhelmingly concerned with political rather than civil rights, that is,
with creating the means by which the governed community established its
its common purposes: the franchise, the allocation of seats to the Assembly,
frequency of elections, and measures to limit corruption of elected represen-
tatives. The exceptions are prohibitions on game laws and monopolies, but
even these can be seen as establishing a claim by members of the community
on the common resources of the community. The emphasis on corruption
and the degeneracy of putting private gain ahead of common wealth is sig-
nificant. Just as despotism—the subjugation of individual rights to the will
of the rules—is the primary pathology of government from the point of view
of the ‘shield’ tradition, from the perspective of the cornerstone tradition
it is the tendency of government and members of the society to degenerate
into the advancement of narrow self-interest rather than the pursuit of the
interests of the polity.
D The constitution as a rulebook
The last two conceptions of the constitution move from the substantive to the
formal. In the context of constitutional theory, this leads their accounts of
the constitution to emphasise traditional, formal conceptions of institutions,
and place in the foreground institutionally oriented ideas such as sovereignty
rather than the more free-standing principles that are the primary focus of
the two substantively-oriented conceptions. If theories at the substantive
end of the scale outlined in Figure 2 can be described as engaged in a search
for principle, then theories at the formal end of that scale can be described
as engaged in a search for the loci of sovereign authority.
In the upper right quadrant, the focus on institutions combines with a
concord-oriented view of the polity to produce a conception of the constitu-
tion as a rulebook for the institutions of state. Although such a conception
does not deny the existence of the principles that are the focus of the ‘shield’
and ‘cornerstone’ conceptions, it tends to subordinate principle to institu-
tions and to read core, canon, and continuity in a manner that emphasises
the institutions themselves rather than the principles they embodied at any
point of time. Constitutional theory, accordingly, does not simply ask what
principles might best resolve a given issue, but which institution is consti-
tutionally tasked with identifying, formulating, and applying the principles
that should be used to resolve that issue.
The practical consequences of viewing a constitution in these terms are
illustrated by the recent jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court on voting
rights. In Rucho v Common Cause,60 which concerned partisan gerryman-
dering, the court did not deny that the redistricting plan at issue was ‘highly
60 Rucho v Common Cause (2019) 139 SCt 2484 (US Supreme Court).
III A Methodology for Constitutional Theory 19
partisan’,61 or that it was ‘incompatible with democratic principles.’62 The
focus of its analysis, however, was on whether responsibility for dealing with
the constitutional challenge posed by partisan gerrymandering lay with the
courts, and it held that it did not. In institutional terms, it was to the state
legislatures, checked and balanced by the federal legislature, that the issue
was assigned.63 Notwithstanding the importance of the principle at stake,
in terms of actual constitutionalism the question was who was tasked with
upholding it.
The idea of the constitution as a rulebook underpins a significant por-
tion of modern constitutional theory, including virtually all of what is termed
‘political constitutionalism’. As the example of Rucho shows, its focus on
the loci of institutional authority gives it a propensity to leave important
social issues unaddressed if the relevant institution is unwilling or unable to
act, and it is this propensity that has formed the basis of the most strident
criticisms of it by ‘shield’ and ‘cornerstone’ theorists.64 From a conception-
internal perspective, however, this subordination reflects the fact that ‘con-
cord’ is not an organic phenomenon in an institutionally oriented concep-
tion. The inherent state of a polity is one of disagreement, not agreement.65
It is only through institutions—and particularly more open-ended political
institutions—that we can carve out islands of concord in the polity, making
the ‘painful compromises’ that are essential a stable and successful polity.66
‘Politics is the medium of concilliation’,67 and institutions are necessary to
make an attained concord workable. As the Jamaican leader Norman Man-
ley put it, the best-written constitution in the world would be of little avail
without institutions animated by a democratic spirit, of the type which he
held Jamaica to have ‘built up and preserved over the years.’68
The political philosophy underpinning this constitutional worldview is
instantiated by Hobbes’ famous image of Leviathan as the body composite
of all members of the polity, and similar ideas are seen in constitutional the-
ories around the world. The Indian constitution, for example, is typically
seen as a cornerstone, as section III(C) has discussed. But at the time of its




64 See e.g. the dismissive comments on ‘the slightly absurd game of “hunt ultimate
sovereign”’ in N Barry, ‘Soveeignty, the Rule of Recognition, and Constitutional Stability
in Britain’ (1994) 2(1) Hume Papers on Public Policy 10, 15.
65 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 1999) 1.
66 C Forsyth, ‘Showing the fly the way out of the flybottle: The value of formalism and
conceptual reasoning in Administrative Law’ (2007) 66(2) Cambridge Law Journal 325,
336.
67 Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ (n 11) 174.
68 NW Manley, ‘The Independence Constitution’ in R Nettleford (ed), Norman Wash-
ington Manley and the new Jamaica: Selected speeches and writings, 1938–68 (Africana
Publishing Corp 1971) 310
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that drafted it, saw it far more as an institutional rulebook. To Ambedkar,
the constitution’s core lay in its creation of strong centralised governmental
institutions that could develop a consensus around the post-independence so-
cial revolution’s intervention in long-established social structures and prac-
tices.69 The constitution’s social provisions, seen by many modern theorists
as clearevidence of its place as a cornerstone,70 was to Ambedkar simply
part of the rulebook, akin to the Instruments of Instructions that were an
important part of colonial administrative practice.71
This does not mean these theories have no role for courts. The courts,
too, have the capacity to provide a field on which individuals can articu-
late ‘the democratic demand of the citizen to be heard’.72 Constitutional
rights can also have a place in a rulebook theory, as the debate on draft-
ing Jamaica’s constitution indicates. In his speech to Jamaica’s Legislative
Council on the proposed constitution, Manley endorsed the incorporation of
a Charter of Fundamental Rights and Liberties, but not for the reasons that
would be offered in a shield-based theory. The Charter, Manley said, would
guide a well-meaning government as a framework within which it could work
and outside which it must not stray. Equally, however, it was essential that
such rules should not limit government discretion inappropriately. ‘If you
are not careful,’ Manley added, ‘you may write yourself out of the right to
do many things that are good and useful to the community.’73
In consequence, the role of courts and rights is also circumscribed by
the constitutional rulebook, and a court that exceeds those bounds acts
unconstitutionally, no matter how pressing the issue. The nature of the
positions to which this leads becomes clear if we compare the positions on
Miller (No. 2) taken by Paul Craig and John Finnis. Craig was writing
from a perspective emphasising principles over institutions and discord over
concord. Discord can affect institutions just as it can affect individuals; and
if the constitution is a shield then sometimes that shield will need to also
protect Parliament against an intransigent executive in times of discord.
Indeed, to fail to so extend the shield calls into questions the principles
that are the core of the constitutional order.74 To Finnis, in contrast, the
constitution is a rulebook, and to read down a distinction between ‘law’ and
‘convention’ that the rulebook formerly accepted is to severely disrupt the
69 BR Ambedkar, Federation versus Freedom (Gokhale Institute 1939).
70 See e.g. T Khaitan, ‘Directive principles and the expressive accommodation of ideo-
logical dissenters’ (2018) 16(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 389.
71 See his speech to the Constitutent Assembly introducing the draft constitution, Con-
stitutent Assembly Debates, Vol VII, 4th November 1948, 7.48.241–244.
72 DAO Edward, ‘The Role of Law in the Rule of Law’ (1994) 2(1) Hume Papers on
Public Policy 10.
73 Manley (n 68) 304-5.
74 PP Craig, ‘The Supreme Court, Prorogation and Constitutional Principle’ [2020] Pub-
lic Law 248.
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institutional configuration that is the core of the constitutional order.75
E The constitution as a truce
The last category sees the constitution as a social and political truce be-
tween factions with significantly different levels of economic and/or political
power. It shares with rulebook theories an emphasis on institutions but,
unlike that view, is pessimistic about the ability of institutions to produce
concord; and unlike theories that treat constitutions as akin to shields, it
is also sceptical about the existence of principles capable of commanding
sufficient assent to protect zones of personal autonomy. It is the state’s task
to stop tensions building up ‘potential towards explosion’,76 and there are
few effective constraints on it when it acts.
Carl Schmitt’s theory instantiates this understanding. Schmitt used the
repeated constitutional crises of the Weimar state to argue that it was the
power of the sovereign—made manifest in the ability to invoke a state of
exception and quell internal enemies—that constitutes the bulwark against
discord threatening the political community.77 Other constitutional theories
seeking to justify autocratic government similarly build on this conception.
Tsuzuki Keiroku’s controversial writings on the Meiji constitution, for ex-
ample, took the view that the national interest must take precedence over
public opinion. It was the right and the duty of the Imperial bureaucracy,
in discharge of their responsibility to the Emperor, to reject the legislature’s
views if they conflicted with the national interest. If the legislature persisted
in its view, the appropriate course of action was ‘as many successive dissolu-
tions of the Diet as necessary’ until it accepted the bureaucracy’s position.78
Likewise, in his critical study of West African constitutional systems after
decolonisation, W. Arthur Lewis argued that political leaders such as Sekou
Touré and Nkrumah, who believed their societies to be afflicted by tribal
and ethnic antagonisms which menaced the unity of the state, had embraced
totalitarian single-party rule as the only route to containing and overcoming
these antagonisms and preventing the polity’s disintegration.79
Quite apart from the insight it gives us into the constitutional under-
pinnings of autocratic states—an issue rarely discussed in mainstream con-
75 J Finnis, ‘The Unconstitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Prorogation Judgment’
(University of Oxford Research Paper 6/2020, 2020) 〈http://ssrn.com/abstract=3548657〉
accessed 1 July 2021.
76 K Llewellyn, ‘The normative, the legal, and the law-jobs: The problem of juristic
method’ (1940) 49(8) Yale Law Journal 1355, 1375-1376.
77 AJ Jacobson and B Schlink (eds), Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis (University of
California Press 2000) provides an excellent overview of the broader intellectual context
of Weimar constitutional theory and of Schmitt’s place within it.
78 J Banno, The establishment of the Japanese constitutional system (JAA Stockwin tr,
Routledge 1992) 31-38.
79 WA Lewis, Politics in West Africa (Oxford Univeristy Press 1965) 50–2.
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stitutional theory—this conception also sheds light on a neglected dimen-
sion of constitutional theory. The idea that the stability of a polity hinges
on ‘painful compromises’ is never far from the surface even in mainstream
constitutional theories; and while constitutional theorists rarely endorse this
conception’s institutional prescriptions, they do nevertheless draw on the di-
agnostic resources it provides while looking elsewhere for solutions.80 Lewis
himself instantiates this. Although he accepted that West African societies
were characterised by mutual antagonism, strongman rule only created a
‘fascist state’81 without resolving the antagonism—unlike well-designed plu-
ralist institutions. As he put it, ‘. . . in the inflamed atmosphere of the plural
society, the unspectacular Prime Minister, who shuffles along, but some-
how manages to keep things going on an even keel, may build a permanent
community, where the strong man may leave only fragments behind.’82
The imagery of confrontation and barely stable compromise also under-
pins the recent critical literature on the South African constitution, arguing
that the constitution represents an unsatisfactory attempt to paper over sig-
nificant and growing differences between the different sides who negotiated
the post-Apartheid settlement,83 but cannot meet the aspirations of the
black majority without adopting an expressly anti-colonial perspective.84
Perhaps more strikingly, it was precisely this imagery that underpinned the
justification of the Turkish military coup of 27 May 1960 by constitutional
scholars: the ousted government had turned the state from ‘a social power
dependant on the law’ to ‘an autocratic power that represents the interests
of a group.’ The discord it had sowed placed an obligation on the army to
‘reestablish the organizations of the state... and legitimate government.’85
In a truce conception, a group that holds itself unjustly marginalised by
a constitutional order will also hold itself justified in rejecting that order
‘in the name of an alternative and deeper legal and moral foundation.’86
That the real world bears this out suggests there is reason to take the truce
conception’s claims seriously.
80 cf Murray’s argument that the social rights in the Irish, German, and Mexican consti-
tutions were motivated by the elites’ fear of social revolution: T Murray, ‘Socio-Economic
Rights Versus Social Revolution? Constitution Making in Germany, Mexico and Ireland,
1917-1923’ (2015) 24(4) Social and Legal Studies 487.
81 Lewis to Keenleyside, quoted in RL Tignor, W. Arthur Lewis and the Birth of Devel-
opment Economics (Princeton University Press 2006) 172.
82 Lewis (n 79) 80.
83 P du Toit, C Swart, and S Teuteberg, South Africa and the Case for Renegotiating
the Peace (SUN Press 2016).
84 T Madlingozi, ‘Social justice in a time of neo-apartheid constitutionalism: Critiquing
the anti-black economy of recognition, incorporation and distribution’ [2017] Stellenbosch
Law Review 123.
85 ‘Principles identified by the Constitutional Commission’ (n 44).
86 S Halliday and B Morgan, ‘I Fought the Law and the Law Won? Legal Consciousness
and the Critical Imagination’ (2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 1, 18-19.
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IV Heuristics and the limits of rhetoric
The discussion thus far has sought to outline the implicit methodology of
constitutional theory and critically examine its strengths and weaknesses.
We have shown that constitutional theory has an ingrained tendency to
lapse into what Hirschman evocatively termed ‘rhetorics of intransigence’,
whose orientation towards formulating and honing arguments exacerbates
rather than ameliorates the challenges and divides that characterise modern
constitutional law.87 In this final section, we offer a deeper diagnosis of
why constitutional theory has a propensity to so lapse and suggest how
the analysis set out in this chapter points to a possible path out of this
intransigence.
A Understanding the impasse
As section II discussed, constitutional theory differs from many other forms
of theory in that it seeks not just to understand the past or present, but
also to shape the future. In most areas of theory, it is possible to draw a
clear distinction between descriptive or analytical theory, on the one hand,
and normative theory on the other. An astrophysicist describing the nature
of black holes, for example, is not thereby seeking to influence black holes
to behave in the manner the theory describes. Similarly, an anthropologist
describing the nature of a society is not doing so to persuade that society
to reshape itself so it better fits with the description.
Constitutional theory is different.88 Constitutional theorists seek not
just to describe facts, but also to create facts. In formulating a theory of
a constitution, a theorist is not just describing the existing constitutional
order, but also seeking to provide a framework that can integrate new de-
velopments into the constitutional order and chart a path for that constitu-
tional order in a still-unfolding future. This is not, and cannot be, a simple
matter of describing and analysing facts. It is inherently concerned with
making new facts, and it inherently straddles the boundary between ana-
lytical and normative theory. A constitutional theorist outlining a theory
of the relationship between different governing institutions is—in sharp con-
trast to an astrophysicist or anthropologist—seeking precisely to persuade
the institutions to behave in the manner the theory suggests.
This means that in law, unlike in most other disciplines, the continued
existence and future states of an institutional fact cannot be separated from
belief in their continued existence and expectations of their future state.89
87 See AO Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Belknap
Press 1991) 168.
88 Although we focus on constitutional theory in this section, the points we make here
also apply to legal theory more generally.
89 cf the discussion in A Ross, On Law and Justice (U Bindreiter tr, Oxford University
Press 2019) 58-63. Note that the repeated references to ‘legal politics’ in the English
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Legal theories deal not just with present facts but also with future facts,
and they do so in a context in which whether or not a particular future fact
eventuates depends in significant part on a theory’s success in influencing
institutional behaviour. It is this that gives the predilections discussed in
section III so much bite. The epistemic confidence that constitutional the-
ories place in the validity of the factual underpinnings of their theories is
not justifiable because that confidence is inextricably linked to the future
facts the theory seeks to produce, and the types of future facts to which
constitutional theory relates are necessarily of a type whose eventuation is
so tenuous that one cannot achieve a justifiable belief that they will come
to pass.90
Constitutional theorists have not, of course, been inattentive to this
point, but the solutions they have suggested have only served to exacerbate
the problem. TRS Allan, for example, has sought to avoid the epistemic
trap we have outlined above by suggesting that constitutional theorists are
doing no more than:
reporting our own opinion, based on a view of constitutional
practice that we find defensible—an account of our practice that
shows how legal doctrine furthers the moral and political values
that a good constitution ought to serve.91
There is an obvious allure to this way of framing the difficulty, but it
is equally precisely the acceptance of this approach that has led to debates
within constitutional theory assuming the form of mere rhetorical clashes
between different styles of public law thought.92 If the starting point is
that this account furthers the moral and political values that any good
constitution would, then it follows that other accounts do not and, for that
reason, must be rejected. Constitutional debate, thus, becomes an effort to
slay the ‘misshapen monsters’, as Kluit termed them, created by competing
theories.
There is a strong parallel between the current state of constitutional
theory and the problem of rhetorics of intransigence which was the focus
of Hirschman’s work. Hirschman was motivated, as we are, by a concern
edition are the result of a mistranslation. Danish does not distinguish between ‘policy’
and ‘politics’ (both are ‘politik ’), and in the overwhelming majority of cases Ross meant
the former rather than the latter.
90 This is why, as we see it, one cannot judge between constitutional theories on the basis
of which provides the best fit, or for that matter the best moral justification for a consti-
tutional practice. Judgements about the relevant practices themselves are baked into the
selection of facts and practices that demand explanation, and which don’t. For a sophis-
ticated argument to the contrary see S. Lakin, ‘Why Common Law Constitutionalism is
Correct (If It Is)’, chapter XX in this volume.
91 Allan, Sovereignty of law (n 48) 19.
92 Loughlin (n 8) 62.
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that public discourse had come to be ever more characterised by an im-
passe in which opposing schools repeatedly deployed the same rhetorical
tools against each other.93 Positions were advanced on the basis that they
were necessary to avoid adverse consequences,94 and they were opposed on
the basis that they would bring adverse consequences95 or jeopardise well-
functioning institutions that had stood the test of time.96 Alternatively,
they were advanced on the basis that they ‘fit’ with the existing political
order97 and with the general trend of historical development,98 but were
opposed on the basis that they sought to change characteristics that were
so deeply entrenched in the social order that any attempt to change them
was bound to fail.99 Hirschman argued that unless public discourse moved
beyond these positions, it would descend into a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ that
was far from friendly to the type of open-minded opinion-forming processes
on which liberal democracy depends.100
B From rhetoric to heuristics: towards a resolution
How, then, can we overcome this impasse? The answer lies in acknowl-
edging that the epistemic confidence we can place in any single account of
the constitution is necessarily limited. Rather than approaching constitu-
tional theory from a starting point which holds that there is always one
account of constitutional practices that is superior to its competitors, one
should approach the area with the appreciation that no theoretical position
in constitutional law does justice to the variety and diversity of the body
of social facts from which constitutional theories are drawn.101 The con-
struction of a theory is a process not just of expanding our constitutional
world by reading deeper significance into constitutional practices, but also
of shrinking and reducing our constitutional world by winnowing out social
facts to which one refuses to attach constitutional significance—a process
that as discussed in section III is fundamentally shaped by the theorist’s
pre-existing worldview in relation to where the balance of significance lies as








101 In this regard, we are in partial agreement and partial disagreement with Sarah Na-
son’s contribution, S Nason, ‘Methodological Pluralism and Modern Administrative Law’,
chapter XX in this volume. As should be apparent from Arvind, Halliday, and Stirton
(n 45), we agree that administrative law must be understood in pluralist and empirically
grounded terms if it is to successfully solve the problems to which it is addressed, but
as outlined in this chapter, we believe that a heuristic constitutional theory will show
precisely such a problem-solving orientation.
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between the institutional and the principled, and the civil and the solidary.
A constitutional theorist, in consequence, is operating not nearly so much
like a theorist of the natural or social world as like an editor preparing a
recension of a text attested in multiple fragments or in competing versions.
Recensions are versions of a work produced by a process of critical revi-
sion,102 and represent an attempt to reconstruct an archetype, or best re-
coverable form, of a text from the available evidence of the contents of that
text.103 An editor preparing a recension of a text works on the basis of a wide
body of evidence as to its content: manuscripts and early printed evidence,
but also translations and quotes in other text. Crucially, and precisely like
constitutional theorists, an editor preparing a recension must not just use
sources providing evidence of the best recoverable form, but also reject the
evidence of sources that contradict the reconstructed reading; and will typ-
ically do so based on a pre-existing view as to the nature of the text and its
contents.
This process is strikingly similar to the manner in which Allan, in the
work quoted above, describes constitutional theorists exercising judgement
and forming opinions to construct and advance the reading of the constitu-
tion they hold to be the most defensible.104 The difficulty with relying on
a recension-like methodology in constitutional theory, however, lies in the
wider implications of constitutional theory. As we have argued above, con-
stitutional theories—unlike recensions of texts—are produced not simply for
their own sake, but to exercise influence over how a given polity conducts
public affairs. Shrinking a constitutional world by rejecting a particular so-
cial fact from it is, therefore, not simply a matter of judgement. It seeks
to eliminate or close off the possibility of particular forms of institutional
action, or of priority being accorded to particular types of principles. The-
ories typically justify this with reference to the risks and downsides which
those types of institutional action or principles carry, but a shrinking of the
constitutional world also inevitably entails tradeoffs carrying their own risks
and dangers, the likelihood of whose eventuation will never be known with
certitude.105
The solution to the difficulty this poses, we suggest, lies in moving to-
wards a more heuristic conception of constitutional theory. The terminology
of ‘heuristics’ requires a word of explanation. There is a significant strand
of literature in legal theory that views heuristics with suspicion, seeing it
as having a propensity to lead to systematic error in factual and normative
102 C Baldick, The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms (3rd, Oxford University Press
2015) 304.
103 P Beal, A dictionary of English manuscript terminology, 1450-2000 (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2008) 333.
104 Allan, Sovereignty of law (n 48) 19.
105 cf the very similar points made in Hirschman (n 87) 168–170.
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judgements.106 Heuristics, however, has two distinct aspects.107 The focus
of legal scholarship has largely been on only one of these aspects, namely, the
use of mental shortcuts as a rapid way of answering challenging questions.
Heuristics in this sense is closely associated with biases, and it is unsurpris-
ing that legal theory has been critical of it. The other aspect of heuristics
is different. Here, heuristics are used because reflects the problem itself is
intractable or poorly defined, and not merely to find a simple shortcut to
make decisions that could also have been made in more optimal ways. A
classic example is an environment characterised by multiple needs, drives,
and goals that must be balanced, the relationship between which, and the
content of each of which, is far from certain.108 In a situation like this, char-
acterised not just by incommensurability of goals but also by uncertainty as
to the extent and loci of the incommensurability, there is no non-heuristic
way of resolving the problem.109
In his work on styles of public administration, Christopher Hood pro-
vides an elaboration of the difference between heuristic and non-heuristic
conceptions of theoretical work, which also applies to constitutional the-
ory.110 Non-heuristic approaches to constitutional theory take their start-
ing point in the social pre-commitments they believe to be embedded in
a particular constitutional order. The theorist’s task is to elaborate on
those pre-commitments, analyse their implications for the type of outcomes
that should be promoted in the conduct of public affairs, identify situations
where those outcomes are not in fact being promoted, and put forward sug-
gestions for how the conduct of public affairs might be altered to promote
those outcomes. It is this pattern that constitutional theory as convention-
ally done follows. A heuristic approach, in contrast, takes a very different
starting point. Even if there is agreement that the constitution does in
fact embed certain pre-commitments, there is uncertainty about what those
commitments are, what their practical implications are in a given situation,
and how one resolves a situation in which multiple competing commitments
pull the conduct of public affairs in different directions. This, it should be
stressed, is not because the heuristic conception sees polities as necessary
106 See e.g. CR Sunstein, ‘Hazardous heuristics’ (2003) 70(2) University of Chicago Law
Review 751; CR Sunstein, ‘Moral heuristics’ (2005) 28(4) Behavioral and Brain Sciences
531.
107 For a fuller discussion, see C Engel and G Gigerenzer, ‘Law and heuristics: An in-
terdisciplinary venture’ in C Engel and G Gigerenzer (eds), Heuristics and the law (MIT
Press 2006).
108 HA Simon, ‘Rational choice and the structure of the environment’ (1956) 63(2) Psy-
chological Review 129.
109 There are obvious parallels between our discussion of heuristics and the concept of
improvised order in D Howarth, ‘The British Constitution as Improvised Order’, chapter
XX this volume.
110 C Hood, ‘When extremes meet: “Sprat” versus “Shark” in Public Risk Management’
in C Hood and DKC Jones (eds), Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates on Risk
Management (Routledge 1996).
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located on the discord end of the spectrum. Rather, it is because of the
epistemic limitations of non-heuristic approaches to constitutional theory
discussed in sections II and III: the reductionism that is necessarily and
always embedded in them, the impossibility of having epistemic confidence
in the judgements on which that reductionism is based, and the shaping
role played by theoretical predispositions in producing them. Constitutional
heuristics, in consequence, is willing to modify initially held opinions in light
of new evidence, and tends away from the all-or-nothing outcomes to which
the current structure of constitutional debate leads.111
A heuristic approach to constitutional theory will differ methodologically
from current constitutional theory in two ways. Firstly, heuristics require
theorists to be conscious of the predispositions that underpin their engage-
ment with social facts—of where, in other words, they situate themselves on
the spectrum between focusing on principles and focusing on institutions,
and assuming civil existence or assuming solidary existence. They need,
equally, to be conscious of the resulting predispositions in relation to what
they expect to see in the material, and the risks and tradeoffs inherent in the
form of constitutional reductionism they favour. A heuristic approach is, ac-
cordingly, willing to countenance messiness, and to explore and accept forms
of constitutional action that sit uneasily with its theoretical predispositions
but nevertheless provide workable solutions to constitutional problems. Its
focus is on the type of facts the theorist seeks to create, and the present
and future social needs to which those facts seek to respond, rather than
on cohering strictly to a tightly defined set of philosophical positions. In
engaging with doctrine and practice its focus is not simply on how we might
justify those doctrines or practices but, rather, on the work they do or can
be made to do to meet present and future social needs.
Secondly, and flowing from the first, a more heuristic constitutional the-
ory also approaches sources differently. Where a non-heuristic approach uses
and relies on Kuhnian exemplars—ideal-typical scenarios that showcase the
normative power of the theory—a heuristic approach focuses on examples—
empirically-grounded scenarios that instantiate and illustrate challenging
questions facing constitutional theory, and which frequently sit uneasily with
the more simplistic scenarios that exemplars represent. In consequence, its
primary task is neither a search for a sovereign nor a search for principle, but
a search for experience. As Arun Thiruvengadam has persuasively shown in
his study of South Asian constitutionalism, constitutional courts regularly
draw on and constructively use sources from other jurisdictions in a manner
that sustains and furthers their constitutional tradition, and better equips
it to meet emerging social needs.112
111 Hirschman (n 87) 168–170.
112 AK Thiruvengadam, ‘In Pursuit of “the Common Illumination of Our House”: Trans-
Judicial Influence and the Origins of PIL Jurisprudence in South Asia’ (2008) 2 Indian
Journal of Constitutional Law 67. There is a strong parallel between the phenomena
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This type of socially responsive and epistemically open engagement with,
and willing to draw on, a diverse range of sources is characteristic of a heuris-
tic approach. Legal and political philosophy still has a role in this process,
but as a source of solutions we can borrow, or of problem-definitions we can
use to gain greater insight into the competing policy considerations in an
area, rather than the normative touchstones and sources of legitimacy they
tend to be in non-heuristic approaches. It is this that perhaps constitutes
the bigger break with the manner in which constitutional theory is done
today but, as we have sought to show in this chapter, it as a break that is
necessary if constitutional theory is to be able to move beyond the impasse
to which it has been led.
V Conclusions
In this chapter, we have argued for a shift in the way we think about and do
constitutional theory. Theories, as we have sought to show, are built on an
implicit methodology of selecting and ascribing constitutional significance
to facts, and memorialising, sacralising, and elevating them to a continuity,
core, and canon. These are in turn shaped by predispositions which depend,
firstly, on whether a theorist sees the essence of a polity’s constitutional ar-
rangements as lying in a set of principles or in a configuration of institutions;
and secondly, on whether they see the primary thrust of those arrangements
as lying in working to shape concord or general agreement within the polity,
or to manage the discord that will necessarily characterise any polity where
interests and expectations conflict. We have also proposed an analytical
scheme, drawing on the institutional theories of Mary Douglas, to better
study and model the way in which these predispositions influence consti-
tutional theory. While other analytical schemes exist, such as Loughlin’s
contrast of normativism and functionalism, we believe that the scheme we
propose has a number of advantages over existing approaches. Douglas de-
scribes her approach to culture as one of ‘social-accounting’, which, ‘selects
out of the total cultural field those beliefs and values which are derivable
as justifications for action’ and which constitute an ‘implicit cosmology.’113
Analysing these ‘thought styles’, as she terms them, enables us not just to
classify theories within a scheme, but also to identify the relationship be-
tween justificatory accounts and their implied world-views. Such a focus
is one that is particularly necessary in the context of constitutional theory,
where little if any consideration has been given to the complex relationship
between account-giving, reasons, and beliefs that underpins disagreements
Thiruvegadam discusses and those that underpinned Alan Watson’s theory of legal trans-
plants. See A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd, Uni-
versity of Georgia Press 1993).
113 M Douglas, ‘Cultural Bias’ in In The Active Voice (Routledge revivals, Routledge
2011) 190.
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about how to read a particular constitution.
These points do not, of course, negate the value of constitutional theory
as currently done. There is much insight that constitutional theorisation has
shed, and will continue to shed on the functioning of constitutional orders.
Nevertheless, as the discussion in sections II and III has shown, there has
also been a failure to recognise the ways in which the predilections built
into constitutional theories act to shape and direct the positions they take.
We have sought to argue that a greater focus on these processes, and the
limitations they impose on constitutional theory, will help move constitu-
tional theory beyond its tendency to lapse into unyielding positions whose
allure obscures their limitations. Rather than merely seeking to overcome
other theories through persuasion, the greater use of heuristics will open the
door to a less polarised constitutional world in which entrenched positions
can be the subject of open-minded debate. But even for those who are not
persuaded by the case we have sought to make in favour of heuristics, doing
constitutional theory with a greater awareness of the biases built into it, and
considering more deeply why the form of reductionism that theory takes is
justifiable and why belief in the theory is justifiable notwithstanding the
predilections that form of reductionism inevitably generates, will lead to a
richer and more productive engagement than we currently see.
